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Abstract
The  premise  of  much  intercultural  communication  pedagogy  and  research  is  to  educate 
people  from  different  cultures  towards  open  and  transformative  positions  of  mutual 
understanding  and  respect.  This  discourse  in  the  instance  of  its  articulation  realises  and 
sustains  Intercultural  Communication  epistemologically  –  as  an  academic  field  of  social 
enquiry, and judgementally – as one which locates itself on a moral terrain. By adopting an 
ethical stance towards difference, the discourse of intercultural communication finds itself 
caught  in  a  series  of  aporias,  or  performative  contradictions,  where  interculturalists  are 
projected simultaneously into positions of cultural relativism on the one hand and ideological 
totalism on the other. Such aporias arise because the theoretical premises upon which the 
discourse relies are problematic. We trace these thematics to a politics of presence operating 
within the discourse of intercultural communication and links this to questions of judgement 
and truth in the intercultural public sphere.  We propose that the politics of presence be set 
aside in favour of an intercultural  praxis which is oriented to responsibility rather than to 
truth.
Abstract in Greek
Η διαπολιτισμική επικοινωνία στον τομέα της παιδαγωγικής και της έρευνας διδάσκει αξίες 
αμοιβαίας  κατανόησης  και  σεβασμού  σε  ανθρώπους  προερχόμενους  από  διαφορετικούς 
πολιτισμούς.  Καθώς  αυτές  οι  αξίες  αρθρώνονται,  πραγματοποιούν  και  στηρίζουν  την 
Διαπολιτισμική Επικοινωνία επιστημονικά – ως ακαδημαϊκό τομέα κοινωνικής έρευνας, και 
λογικά – ως τομέα ο οποίος κινήται γύρω από ηθικές θέσεις.  Υιοθετώντας ηθικές θέσεις 
σχετικές  με  τη  διαφορετικότητα,  η  διαπολιτισμική  επικοινωνία  καταλήγει  σε  μια  σειρά 
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αποριών, ή εκτελεστικών αντιφάσεων οι οποίες ταυτόχρονα θέτουν τους διαπολιτισμικούς 
ομιλιτές αφενός σε θέσεις πολιτισμικού συσχετισμού και αφετέρου σε θέσεις ιδεολογικού 
ολοκληρωτισμού. Αυτές οι απορίες δημιουργούνται επειδή οι θεωρητικές προϋποθέσεις στις 
οποίες αυτές οι αξίες στηρίζονται είναι προβληματικές. Επισημαίνουμε αυτά τα θέματα σε 
σχέση  με  τις  αρχές που  κατακλύζουν  τον  τομέα  της  διαπολιτισμικής  επικοινωνίας 
συνδέοντάς  τα  με  κριτικούς  προβληματισμούς  υπάρχοντες  στη  διαπολιτισμική  δημόσια 
σφαίρα.  Προτείνουμε  ότι  αυτές  οι  αρχές  θα  πρέπει  να  τεθούν  κατά  μέρος  υπέρ  μιας 
διαπολιτισμικής πρακτικής που θα είναι προσανατολισμένη στην ευθύνη παρά στην αλήθεια. 
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Introduction: the discourse of intercultural communication
For  seven  years  the  International  Association  for  Languages  and  Intercultural 
Communication  (IALIC)  has  sought  to  bring  together  multidisciplinary  perspectives  and 
understandings in intercultural communication studies. This endeavour has largely proceeded 
on the premise that the people who are engaged in it have an interest in culture in one form or  
another and in the differences (and commonalities) which exist within and between diverse 
communities at local and global levels. It is difficult, given the diversity of the material that  
exists, to sum up briefly the nature of the shared sentiment we as members of IALIC have, 
which motivates us to renew our subscriptions, attend IALIC conferences and submit papers 
to proceedings and to the association journal; but in its most general aspect we might say that 
we  are  concerned  to  promote  intercultural  understanding  and  awareness  across  cultural 
divides, and to transform individual human consciousnesses in some way that is productive 
and positive for the communities to which we belong, as well as those to which we do not. 
We are also,  inevitably,  concerned with the academy and the dissemination amongst  our 
peers of scholarly research as an enjoining, we hope, to a greater intensity of intercultural 
praxis and debate.  
The discourse of intercultural communication, for that is what we shall call it, seeks to be 
interventionist and prefers to think of itself as such (see Tomic & Kelly, 2001, 2002; Tomic 
& Thurlow, 2002, 2004; Phipps & Guilherme, 2003; Giroux, 2003, 2006; Jack, 2004). It 
intervenes  in  the transnational  public arena of intercultural  debate in  the belief  that  such 
interventions  may help to  reduce  conflict,  promote  cooperation  and increase  intercultural 
understanding. It seeks to publicise and raise awareness of the ‘languaging’ of intercultures, 
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that is, of the linguicism of national and supranational cultures and identities, and of how 
language  permeates,  mediates  and  constructs  them.   This  includes  conceptions  of  the 
possibility of a ‘transcultured self’ – the multicultured self/other who traverses the intercultural 
terrain in openness, understanding and tolerance of the Other (Jordan, 2001; Crawshaw et al, 
2001; Holland, 2002; Liu, 2002; Parry, 2003; Monceri, 2003, 2005; Strümper-Krobb, 2003; 
Turner,  2003;  Pan,  2004;  Glaser,  2005). Above  all,  the  discourse  of  intercultural 
communication draws critically from the well of global injustice and human disenchantment 
a desire ‘to confront and resist […] the inequalities of cultural and economic capital’ (Tomic 
& Thurlow, 2002: 82; see also Tomic and Lengel, 1999).   Jack (2004: 122), invoking Marx, 
states, ‘Our aim is not just to understand this inequitable world, the point is to change it’ (see 
Marx,  1845/2000:  173).  The  transculturalism  and  criticality  of  the  association  has  been 
augmented by an impressive interdisciplinary range of conference papers, editorial pages and 
journal  articles  (e.g.  Shi-xu & Wilson,  2001;  Roy and Starosta,  2001;  Walravens,  2002; 
Tietze, 2004; Stibbe, 2004; Wilkinson, 2005, Bielsa, 2005; Menezes de Souza, 2006; Cheng 
& Warren, 2006; Cools, 2006) and by a strong concern for pedagogy (e.g. Sharifian, 2001; 
Diaz-Greenburg & Nevin, 2003; Ros i Solé, 2004; Belz, 2005; Gonçalves Matos, 2005; Atay, 
2005; Shi, 2006; Crosbie, 2006; MacDonald, Badger & Dasli 2006). Taken as a whole these 
elements  of  the  association’s  activities  constitute  a  formidable  helix of  interdisciplinary 
interests  and  concerns.   At  the  risk  of  ruining  a  promising  metaphor,  the  discourse  of 
intercultural communication is the thread which holds the helix together – it is no less than its 
intercultural genome.
Transformation, transcendentalism and truth
The problem with threads is that, if pulled, they have a tendency to unravel the thing that they 
are attached to. This is a serious problem, because what we are dealing with is something 
extremely  important,  so  important  in  fact  that  doing  any  kind  of  intercultural  work  is 
impossible without it. This is, the rationale for doing intercultural work at all. For IALIC it is 
unnervingly easy to formulate an answer to the question which this implies; one that makes 
us feel good about ourselves and which readily legitimates the critical stand that we want to 
take. The easy answer is that we do intercultural work because we want to empower people, 
to raise their awareness about exploitation, manipulation, prejudice and abuse, and to  move 
them to act upon this awareness – we want to provoke a transformational response.  One of 
the more substantial voices arguing for such an agenda is Giroux (2003, 2006), who in a 
recent edition of the journal declares that:
3
Intellectuals have a responsibility not only to make truth prevail in the 
world and fight  injustice wherever  it  appears,  but  also to  organise 
their  collective  passions  to  prevent  human  suffering,  genocide  and 
diverse  forms  of  unfreedom linked  to  domination  and exploitation 
[…] Such a  stance  not  only  connects  intellectual  work  to  making 
dominant power accountable,  it  also makes concrete  the possibility 
for transforming hope and politics into an ethical space and public act 
that  confronts  the  flow of  everyday  experience  and  the  weight  of 
social suffering with the force of individual and collective resistance 
and  the  unending  project  of  democratic  social  transformation. 
(Giroux, 2006: 170-71)
Thurlow, from a pedagogic perspective, invokes hooks in referring to this attitude as one of 
‘teaching to transgress’ (Tomic & Thurlow, 2002: 83; hooks, 1994; Thurlow, 2004). But not 
all of us are entirely comfortable with the idea of doing this. Many teachers, for example, do 
not  see  it  as  their  role  either  to  radicalise  their  students  or  to  disturb  their  carefully 
sedimented  subjectivities.  Others,  like  ourselves,  do  subscribe  to  this  view,  but  not 
unproblematically, and not unquestioningly either.  Still, within IALIC we sense that there 
would be general agreement that the association does have a transformational purpose which 
sees the desedimentation of subjectivities as a positive and productive intervention because it 
gives strength to the hope that ‘things might be different some day’ (Adorno, 1973: 323). 
Disagreement with the propositions which Giroux, Thurlow and others in IALIC have put 
forward for a transformational approach is therefore not our precise purpose in this paper. 
The propositions are indeed all too easy to agree with, and it is this which is part of the 
problem.  For in agreeing to them we also seem to be signing up for a politics of presence (cf.  
Derrida, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1988; see also Thurlow, 2004). Of this, and what it means, we 
will have more to say in a moment. 
In  this  paper  we  enquire  into  the  grounds  on  which,  in  the  discourse  of  intercultural 
communication, these types of propositions are made, about justice, equality, prejudice and 
so  on.   To  put  this  another  way,  if  the  answer  as  to  why  we  engage  in  intercultural 
communication pedagogy and research is easy, much more difficult is how we are supposed 
to know that the truth that we wish to prevail and to instil in our students is the correct one. 
More pointedly, on the basis of what privileged insight are we able to make that claim?  For  
we are claiming privilege here, the privilege that we are able to determine for others what the 
truth  is,  about  power,  about  suffering,  about  difference,  about  the  ‘emerging  global 
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barbarism’ around us (Giroux, 2006: 171).  It will be averred that this truth is always open to 
debate  and  critical  analysis  in  the  intercultural  public  sphere  and  is  therefore  open  to 
modification and even refutation.  Yes, but what makes it superior and different  to the other 
‘truths’ that are out there, to which we are opposed, for example about globalisation,  so-
called  good-governance,  sovereignty,  self-determination,  God  and  war,  which  are  also 
equally open to debate in the same public sphere?  How, in other words, is the discourse of  
intercultural  communication  not  just  another  metanarrative  (Lyotard,  1984)  –  a  master-
template for explaining the totality and for restructuring it in another ‘truer’ way?  Problems 
arise when the master-narrative does indeed lead to a process of transformation only to come 
into conflict, as it must do, with those who are not persuaded by it, let’s say in our case neo-
conservatives,  traditionalist  religious  groups, female circumcisionists  and anti-abortionists, 
all  of  whom  in  our  wide  fraternity  are  not  necessarily the  Other,  and  who  may  also 
reasonably object to being lumped together in this manner.  Nevertheless, it  seems that in 
order for our truth to prevail, the interests of at least some (all?) of these groups must be 
subordinated to our own and, if needs be, silenced by force.  On what grounds would our use 
of force against these groups be legitimated?  Can it be legitimated?  Do we sign up for this  
force?  These are difficult questions to which the discourse of intercultural communication 
has no ready answers beyond the insistence that our truth is the correct truth and that to 
question this is a form of intellectual cowardice (Giroux, 2003: 184).
It seems to us that the only way the discourse of intercultural communication is presently able 
to  ground itself  is  by appealing  to  a  transcendental  moral  signified.   That  is,  a  Kantian 
noumenon, or moral theism, existing outside human experience against which truth claims 
can be measured and truth judgements made.  Kant saw the operation of the noumenon as a 
priori to the world and distilled it in his work in terms of a faith that it was there.  That is, he 
believed that it existed, but also that it was impossible to step outside our world to see it, 
know it or experience it. The discourse of intercultural communication is a Kantian discourse 
in this respect.  It relies on having faith that its truths are the correct truths, but is unable to 
explain why this is so.  This is the problem faced by all  discourses which claim truth to 
themselves and brings to mind one of Nietzsche’s observations.  He said, ‘There are no facts, 
everything is in flux, incomprehensible, elusive; what is relatively most enduring is – our 
opinions’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 327).  If the discourse of intercultural communication is unable 
to ground itself other than by appealing to a-historical and a-discursive transcendentals, how 
does its truth rise above that of an opinion?  How also are we to be able to adjudicate between 
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different  truth  claims  and  to  decide  which  ones  to  support,  respect  or  condemn?   For 
example, female circumcision, arranged marriages, the wearing of the veil, abortion?  If we 
are unable to respond to these questions effectively, we leave ourselves open either to cultural 
relativism, in which all social practices are equally good, or to political inertia, in which the 
only question is ‘Why bother?’  Why bother with consciousness raising and why bother with 
intellectual work if we are unable to make judgemental claims about truth?  
Intercultural consciousness and the politics of presence
Let us return to this question shortly.  First, we will put some additional flesh on the problem. 
We  have  referred  to  a  politics  of  presence inhabiting  the  corridors  of  intercultural 
communication debate. By a politics of presence we are speaking of an Enlightenment desire 
for plenitude,  for a satisfactory repletion of ideas and outcomes,  a fulfilling resolution of 
difference.  In other words, it is the desire we have for fulfilment and purity in the concepts 
that we employ in our work and the consequences which they portend.  So we wish for 
justice, equality, understanding, openness, truth, etc. – an organic ordering of the intercultural 
whole, in which all these elements are all neatly arranged. In the discourse of intercultural  
communication  this  translates  as  a  desire  for  the  transformation  of  intercultural 
consciousness, that is, for a transformational change in the consciousness of the intercultural 
speaker. In our work this has most frequently been expressed as a pedagogic aim in learning 
of foreign languages:
In so far as we all share a basic repository of values and norms of 
behaviour … and have a common repertoire of emotional/affective 
responses, it can be said that there is a cultura franca ... Beyond this, 
the capabilities … – of recognition, acceptance and wider application 
– would seem to suggest a toolbox for individuals to build a mutual 
cultura franca, if not a universal one. (Killick, 1997: 257)
Intercultural  competence,  as  part  of  a  broader  foreign  speaker 
competence,  identifies the ability of a person to behave adequately 
and in a flexible manner when confronted with actions, attitudes and 
expectations  of  representatives  of  foreign  cultures.  (Meyer,  1991: 
137)
The intercultural speaker is someone who crosses frontiers, and who 
is to some extent a specialist in the transit of cultural property and 
symbolic values. (Byram & Zarate, 1997: 11) 
We may therefore claim to have an epistemologically reasoned basis 
on which to assert  that cross-cultural  competence implies a certain 
6
kind of linguistic competence…and that such linguistic competence 
implies having acquired, not simply a new way to represent ideas or 
to get things done, but – above all – a new way of being (Boylan, 
2000: 174).
These pedagogic aims appear to entail a weak claim and a strong claim in the development of 
an intercultural consciousness. The weak claim is that the intercultural speaker is enabled to 
recognise difference in  the beliefs,  attitudes  and values  of the Other,  and to  tolerate  this 
difference. This already entails a certain shift in the consciousness and the identity of the 
Self.  The strong claim is  the  one  which  was noted  earlier,  that  the  intercultural  speaker 
recognises difference in the beliefs, attitudes and values of the Other, and actually embraces 
them in order to become transcultured. This then marks a move towards a hybridisation of 
consciousness and identity, towards transculturation. The logical endpoint of the strong claim 
would  be the  development  of  an  integrated  universal  consciousness,  and it  is  this  which 
provides the strong claim’s politics of presence.  In this respect IALIC seems to be retreading 
the philosophical journey of the nineteenth century. The need for fulfilled transformational 
meaning, or  presence, is an idea which has a long intellectual history in both western and 
eastern thought.  In the west, it is Hegel who first sets this idea in motion. In the Philosophy 
of  History  (1822)  he  presents  the  view  that  the  history  of  humankind  involves  the 
transformational development of Mind, or Spirit, towards full consciousness.
World  history  merely  shows  how  the  spirit  gradually  attains 
consciousness  and  the  will  to  truth;  it  progresses  from  its  early 
glimmerings to major discoveries and finally to a state of complete 
consciousness  …  The  principles  of  the  national  spirits  in  their 
necessary  progression  are  themselves  only  moments  of  the  one 
universal spirit, which ascends through them in the course of history 
to its consummation in an all embracing totality. (Hegel, 1822/1999: 
404).
Mind/Spirit is a collective consciousness and may be equated with the cogito, Reason.  It is 
through the exercise of reason that the full consciousness of humanity is attained. Until this 
time  each  individual  subsists  as  an  ‘unhappy  consciousness’  –  unfulfilled,  confused  and 
alienated.  This alienation is experienced as an incomprehension of the world the unhappy 
consciousness  inhabits  and  as  a  sensation  of  separation  from  the  Other.   In  the 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) Hegel writes:
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The  Unhappy  Consciousness  itself  is  the  gazing  of  one  self-
consciousness into another, and itself is both, and the unity of both is 
also its essential nature.  But it is not yet explicitly aware that it is its 
essential nature, or that it is the unity of both.  (Hegel, 1807/1999: 
104; original emphasis)
In other words, the unhappy consciousness is not aware that its identity, its understanding of 
its Self, is dependent upon and only established through the existence of the Other.  That its 
identity is in truth that of a self/other.  The alienation of the unhappy consciousness is resolved 
by humankind’s eventual realisation that the Self and the Other are one and the same, that 
there is no difference between them – Mind is everything.  This occurs as a staged awakening 
of  Mind  through  history,  that  is,  as  an  exponential  transformation  of  consciousness  and 
awareness  through  time  towards  absolute  knowledge  and  understanding.  This  full 
rationalisation  of  the  world  brings  history  to  an  end.  There  is  in  this  teleology  some 
remarkable  similarities  with  the  teachings  of  Buddhism.  Here  we  find  the  journey  of 
humankind towards full consciousness embodied in the quest of Sidarta for Enlightenment. 
Where Hegel sees the attainment of universal consciousness as a dialectical progression of 
Mind through historical  epochs,  one more enlightened than the other,  Buddhism sees the 
attainment of a transcendental consciousness, or Nirvana,  as the endpoint of a process of 
personal ‘cultivation’ of being: ‘Nirvana…is the primal bright essence of consciousness that 
can bring forth all conditions’ (Hsuan, n.d.: 239).
Marx responds to this universalised narrative by inverting Hegel’s dialectic of consciousness 
and placing it on a materialist base.  
Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc – real, active 
men,  as  they  are  conditioned  by  a  definite  development  of  their 
productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to 
its furthest forms.  Consciousness can never be anything else other 
than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life 
process […] In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends 
from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven (Marx, 
1846/2000: 180).  
In Marx’s hands the historical progress of the Hegelian dialectic by means of reason is thus 
replaced with historical progress by means of advances in the material forces of production. 
Moreover, it is the material circumstances of existence which are ultimately determinate of 
human consciousness, and not the other way around: ‘It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines  their  being,  but,  on  the  contrary,  their  social  being  that  determines  their 
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consciousness’ (Marx, 1859/2000: 425).  What is unchanged in this reformulation is that the 
project  it  announces  still  articulates  a  politics  of  presence.  Where  presence  for  Hegel  is 
absolute  knowledge and the  fully  rational  society,  where  ‘the  whole  is  the  true’  (Hegel, 
1807/1999: 53), presence for Marx requires individuals ‘to abolish the very condition of their 
existence hitherto’ (Marx, 1846/2000: 198), that is, the exploitation of one class by another 
under Capitalism. Presence for Marx is thus embodied in the classless organics of the post-
capitalist society. 
Totality and terror in intercultural communication
The politics of presence comes in for sustained critique by Nietzsche (1968), and later, by 
Adorno (1973, 1977) and Foucault (1980, 1981, 1984), who all see  presence as totalising, 
although they do not use the term.  For Nietzsche, presence is articulated as a will to power – 
‘A kind of lust to rule [which] would like to compel all other drives to accept it as a norm’ 
(Nietzsche, 1968: 267).  For Adorno, the desire for presence is termed ‘identity thinking’, that 
is, a type of thinking which posits reconciliation of the whole.  To Hegel he says, ‘A mind 
that is to be a totality is a nonsense. It resembles the political parties in the singular which 
made their appearance in the twentieth century, tolerating no other parties beside them […] 
The whole is the false’ (Adorno, 1973: 199; 1978: 50).  To Marx he says history guarantees 
us nothing – ‘No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one 
which leads from the slingshot to the megaton bomb’ (Adorno, 1973: 430).  Foucault, adopts 
a Nietzschean view of the desire for presence as a will to truth, and asks, ‘What types of 
knowledge do you want to disqualify,  in the very instance of your  demand?’   (Foucault, 
1980: 85). For all three, the desire for presence masks a potential violence, a terror, because it  
must involve the suppression of other kinds of thinking if its truth is to prevail.  
The violence of presence is nowhere better elaborated than in the work of Derrida (1976, 
1978, 1981, 1988).  Indeed, presence is his term. Derrida first draws our attention to presence 
in the logocentric workings of the Saussurean sign.  Here the union of the signifier and the 
signified seems to satisfy, in the first instance, a desire for a certain type of fulfilment, that of  
having a sound or mark which can be used to refer to a concept. But having seemingly named 
the concept,  we find that the concept has no meaning except in its difference from other 
signs, as there are no self-identical words or signs.  He gives this the name  différance, a 
neologism for how the sign is never truly fulfilled.  Différance entails that there are no pure 
signs – ‘There is  no experience consisting of  pure  presence’ (Derrida,  1988: 10; original 
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emphasis).  For example, the ‘inside’ can never be a pure inside, because it is dependent on 
there  being  an  ‘outside’.   For  this  reason  Derrida  demonstrates  how the  essence  of  the 
signified must be formally prior to the sign, and that fulfilment, or ‘full presence’, cannot be 
claimed  except  by  making  recourse  ‘in  favour  of  a  meaning  supposedly  antecedent  to 
différance, more original than it, exceeding and governing it in the last analysis.  This is […] 
the presence of […] the ‘transcendental  signified’’ (Derrida,  1981: 29) – the signified to 
which  all  signifiers  ultimately  refer,  where  meaning  can  come  to  rest  in  itself.   If  the 
transcendental signified is prior to the sign, it is, like Kant’s noumenon, a-discursive and a-
historical, outside our experience, unknowable. The transcendental signified is the object of 
the human longing for fulfilment and plenitude – a craving for the unfulfilled unity of the 
sign itself.
The longing for presence does violence to the sign by seeking to ‘fix’ its concepts against the 
transcendental signified. For Derrida, this is an impossibility. The transcendental signified is 
not present to us, it is  outside the text, of which there is ‘no outside’ (Derrida, 1976: 156). 
Meaning, therefore,  cannot  be ‘fixed’.   In place of the absent signified Derrida posits  an 
endless chain of signifiers, one referring to the other ad infinitum. In his words, ‘The meaning 
of meaning […] is infinite implication, the indefinite referral of signifier to signifier […] its  
force is a certain pure and infinite equivocality which gives signified meaning no respite, no 
rest, but engages in its own economy so that it always signifies again and differs’ (Derrida, 
1978: 29; original emphasis).  This entails that no meaning can ever be fully grasped in its 
entirety, complete and whole, in its full presence, because signifiers only refer, and time does 
not stop for them.  To claim that we  know what  justice,  or truth,  or understanding is, is 
therefore a deceit and a violence to these concepts, for by attempting to fix them we close 
them down. We also run into the danger of arrogating to ourselves the belief that we have 
privileged access to the noumenal signified, the signified outside, and this is dangerous, for in 
claiming  such  entitlements,  truth  becomes  an  organising  principle  against  which  ‘lesser’ 
truths might then be measured. When truth becomes an organising principle, it finds itself in 
conflict  with  these  lesser  truths  and  reacts  with  violence  towards  them.   The  western 
alliance’s ‘War on Terror’ and the naked Jihadism of Al-Qaeda are both examples of truths 
which are being used in this way.  The will to truth is a colonising discourse, it colonises the 
discursive terrain according to its own perceptions based as it is on the apparent obviousness 
of its own moral correctness (O’Regan, 2006).
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Conclusion: Reconstructing intercultural praxis
We wonder then where this leaves the discourse of intercultural communication. If we cannot 
ground it upon truth, and we cannot distinguish between which cultural practices we should 
support and which we should not, what should we ground it upon?  How do we avoid cultural 
relativism and inertia?  Is there any way of reconstructing an intercultural praxis so that it was 
no longer dependent upon claims to truth?  These are some of the questions that concern us 
and to which we seek an answer.  Is there a way out of these aporias?
Perhaps there is, if we can be responsible about it. For if judgemental truths are caught up in 
the metaphysical complicity of a signed universe which cannot be critiqued without recourse 
to the sign itself (Derrida, 1978), the motivation and rationale for critique has to be derived 
from  within  a  system  of  signs  in  which  ethical  concepts  are  not  dependent  upon 
transcendentals – a transcendental signified. For this reason, the discourse ethics of Derrida 
posits that we have an infinite responsibility to the Other, for without this responsibility ‘you 
would not have moral and political problems, and everything that follows from this’ (Derrida 
cited  in  Critchley,  1999:  108;  see  also  Derrida,  2003).  In  other  words,  it  is  through 
responsibility,  rather than through the foundationalist presuppositions of presence, that the 
discursive  terrain  remains  open,  and that  questions  of  ‘non-normative’  ethical  judgement 
become possible, and indeed necessary. Without responsibility, the hope which is carried in 
the possibility of the Other that, for example, things might be different one day, as well as the 
praxis which such hope implies, would be denied. By focusing on our responsibility to the 
Other, and therefore on our responsibility to openness in opposition to closure, the point is to 
determine  not  whether  different  truths  are  good or  bad,  but  whether  putting  a  particular 
discourse or set of discourses into practice might lead to a silencing of open alternatives and 
therefore also a turning away from the Other. That these alternatives should be open makes it  
possible for IALIC theoretically to locate itself in opposition to perspectives and practices 
which we, as interculturalists, would associate with closure while simultaneously seeking to 
exercise reflexive support for more open alternatives, not because we know it is right to do so 
but because we know that not to do so would be an act of irresponsibility.
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